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Introduction
Foreign observers have frequently cemented on the localized nature
of land use conflicts in the United States. In Western Europe, protest
actions triggered by land use controversies are usually focused on
central governments. When mobilization for political action is attempted,
the target is a parliament or the chamber of deputies. In contrast, the
typical focus of American protests relating to land use is city hall, the
county commissioners, or a state legislature. Underlying this fragmented
nature of land use conflicts is one of the most fundamental characteristics
of American federalism: Land law is state law. And the implementation of
land law has largely been devolved to municipalities, counties and other
minor civil division of government. Only one state, Hawaii, has an
explicit state-wide system of zoning for land use. Several states,
including Vermont and California, have authorized extensive participation
by the state in land
gradual migration of
up the governmental
a~ the state level.
use planning activities. Although there has been a
the direct exercise of land use planning authority
ladder in recent decades, it still stops short
The influence of the federal government in guiding land use is thus largely
confined to the use of indirect measures. Though’indirect, these are
not ineffectual, and their influence has vastly increased since the
Second World War. It is the thesis of this paper that, in contrast to
the direct exercise of legal authority to control land use, the major-2-
determinants of land use now reside in this federal dynamic. The following
sections will explore some of the ways in which this is manifest’. Space
does not permit any probing in depth. The paper instead will be confined
to an annotated catalogue of some of the principal ways in which federal
hegemony over the use of non-federal land is gaining ascendancy over the
conventional legal authority of the states,
Inflation and the Price Level
The most pervasive aspect of recent federal policies affecting land
use is also the most intangible, Persistent inflation now determines the
economic planning perspective, for land and for all other economic variables.
This is not a new phenomenon in the United States. We have had periods
of acute inflation in the past, and especially in land values. A substantial
part of our history can be written around successive episodes of land boom
and bust. Why is this inflation different?
First, because of its duration and apparent life expectancy. Past
inflations have sometimes been clisastrous, but short lived. We have not
had to live with endemic inflation, Housing finance has not had to
reckon with prospective property value increases over the life of loans
that result in net negative rates of interest. Long term investment plans
for agriculture have not had to balance earnings from farm operation with
inflationary increases in asset values that promise to dwarf any increases
in profitability due to wise Investments or prudent operation, Even in the
most acute inflations of the past, the prospect of long-term capital gains
in land had not entered prominently into farm income accounting. Today it
does.
Second, because the rural-urban balance has shifted so drastically.
Inflations in the past century occurred when 15 to 40 percent of the-3-
population was still engaged in agriculture. We have no history of coping
with inflation when the population in control of agricultural land is 7,
5, or 3 percent of total population. We have no institutions to protect
agriculture from scared or restless non-farm capital seeking shelter through
land purchase% in the magnitudes now concentrated in urban-industrial hands.
An urban-industrial society relieves the vast majority of its people
from the necessity to provide their own :food. It does not destroy their
d.efiire to use and own rural land. Disenchantment with dense urban settle-
ments is emerging as a major characteristic of our advanced industrial
society. Transport technology, shorter work weeks and rising real incomes
have given the majority of the urban population the time, the money, and
the motivation to increase their consumption of rural land.
In the United States, personal consumption expenditures in constant
dollars doubled from 1939 to 1959, and doubled again from 1959 to 1977.
Even when adjusted for population growth, per capita personal expenditures
in 1977 were 136 percent above the 1939 level (Economic Report of the
President, 1978, pp, 258, 287). In 1977 approximately half of total personal
consumption expenditures were on housing, household maintenance, transportation?
and recreation--expendituresin which land plays a prominent role. In 1939
the comparable expenditure group accounted for only about one-third of
total consumer expenditures (StatisticalAbstract of the United States, 1948).
Affluence has sharply increased urban demand for rural land. As a
result, the farmer must bid for his land against other farmers, and
increasingly against non-farmers as well (R-sup, 1975). The demand curve for
rural land has shifted sharply to the right, for reasons that have little
to do with the demand for food and fiber. This shift has not been tini.form-4-
throughout the United States, but it has been pronounced in the dairy belt
of the Northeast and Lake States, in the Eastern Corn Belt, and in the
Atlantic, Gulf, and West Coast regions containing some of our most productive
lands.
The third reason why inflation today impinges so heavily on land use
is because the balance between operating and fixed capital in agriculture
has undergone so radical a transformation. In the past, the ratio of the
cost of purchased inputs to the gross value of output stood in the range of
one to ten, or one to five. Today in intensive crop agricultural systems
this ratio is in the range of one to 1.5 or ofieto two” In livestock
and poultry feeding it is in the range of 1 to 1.2 or 1.4, ThiS $hifts
the incidence of inflation within agriculture, by putting a penalty on
slow-maturing enterprises and a premium on fast turnover.
This emphasizes one of the most insidious influences of inflation --
its effect on expenditures and the structure of investment. Synthetically
created purchasing power result~ in patterns of expenditure that are
distorting, %ot by being excessive in total amount (and so inflationary),
but by being wrong in composition -- directed too largely either towards
consumption or towards the formation of somehow inappropriate and unproductive
mixes of capital” {Brown, 197’9,pp. 1-2). Threaded throughout the following
discussion we will see examples of ways in which inflation has converted
land into a consumers good or has diverted investment into less productive
channels.-5-
Tax policy
In contrast to the indirect influences of inflation, the most direct
influence of federal government policy on land use arises through taxation.
At first glance, this seems incongruous, for there is no direct federal
tax on land. Just as land law is state law, land taxes are local taxes,
from which only a few states continue to derive any substantial amounts
of state revenue. The federal influence arises through its predominance
in the field of income taxation, and the dramatic growth in importance of
measures of tax avoidance associated with rising income leveLs. This
growth has been so recent that it is not fully revealed in published
statistics.
From 1970 to 1976 (the most recent date for which data are available)
the total number of individual federal income tax returns increased from
73,863,000 to 84,536,000, or 14.4 percent (Stat. Abstract of the U.S., 1978, p. 269).
In the same period~ returns with annual adjusted gross incomes (AGI) of
$25,000 or more increased from 2,115,000 to 8,414,000, or four-fold. The
population of individuals wieh incomes at levels that make ic rewarding
to seek out means of tax avoidance has generated a new service sector of




with the graduated and progressive nature of the federal
tax give a corresponding progressive value to allowable
is not the case with the corporate income tax, which is
essentially flat-rate on corporate incomes exceeding $100,000,
In consequence, rapidly rising income levels have given high-income
individuals added incentive to avoid tax where possible while at the same
time and due to the progressive rate structure, the value of allowable
deductions has accelerated at a rate greater than the rate of increase in
incomes. Since some of the most rewarding opportunities for tax avoidance and-6-
and some of the highest valued allowable deductions concern real estate,
these trends have had a major influence on land use.
A sense of the magnitudes involved is provided by the estimates of
revenue loss to the federal government through the deductibility of
mortgage interest and property taxes on owner-occupied homes. The revenue
loss of “tax expenditure” from these two sources is estimated at $14.1
billion in 1979, and is projected to rise to $30.0 billion by 1984
(CongressionalBudget Office, 1979, p. 16). ‘TheU.S. Senate report on
Tax Expenditures points out that “high incane individuals receive greater
proportional benefits than low income persons, not only because of higher
marginal tax rates, ‘butalso because higher income taxpayers are more
likely to own one or more homes and to itemize deductions ...(and) to own
higher priced homes with larger mortgages and higher property taxes”
(U.S. Senate, 1978, p. 69).
Since the equivalent of rental income on owner-occupied homes is not
iucluded as taxable income but the property tax and debt service expenses
of earning it are deductibles the effect is to subsidize owner-occupied
housing. This creates a derived demand for building lots and encourages
urban sprawl. In this way federal tax policy subsidizes the suburbs and
has powerfully augmented the conversion of farm land to residential uses.
In the farm sector, a similar tax-induced stimulus to the demand for
land is created by the combined effects of the investment tax credit and
the use of one of several accounting methods in computing accelerated
depreciation on equipment and special-purpose buildings. For example,-7-
a farmer with a combined federal and state marginal income tax rate of
42 percent and using a seven-year depreciation schedule can obtain a
present-valued tax saving over the seven years equivalent to 45 percent of
the cost of a new item of equipment or special purpose building. If his
combined marginal tax rate is 33 percent, the present-valued saving is
37 percent of the purchase price, If his marginal tax rate is 10 percent,
the saving is only 18 percent, and if he has no net taxable income the
purchase price will be the real cost to him of the new item (Fuller, 1978,
p. 3).
‘I’his results in a subsidy to farm enlargement, in that the federal
tax expenditure represented by &he investment cax credit and accelerated
depreciation reduces the variable cost of farming more land. This gives
an advantage in the land market to a buyer who is in a relatively high income
Eax bracket, has substantial debt-carrying capacity, and is highly mechanized.
It tends to penalize the farmer who provides most of his labor supply from
family resources, buys few purchased inputs, and extends the life of his
equipment by careful maintenance and repair. The most significant consequence
for land use is the encouragement thus given to large, single-purpose or
monocultural farm enterprises, with a resultant greater exposure to market
or climatic hazards. The farm sector loses resiliency.
These effects are augmented by tax policy with respect to capital
gains. For example, dairy and beef herd owners strongly support the
continuation of capital gains tax treatment for breeding animals. small
farmers are as strong in their support for these tax expenditures as are
large farmers. They do not seem to realize that these preferential capital
gains tax privileges are of primary advantage to high income individuals.-8-
The tax payer who is in a high marginal tax bracket and expects to remain
in this bracket in subsequent years can afford to pay more for the privelege
of capital gains tax treatment of his breeding animals. This privelege
is of little value to a smaller operator whose marginal tax bracket is below
28 percent (the maximum capital gains tax rate, effective Jan. 1, 1979).
In supporting the continuation of preferential capital gains tax rates the
smaller operators are giving a bidding advantage to high income operators in
&he competition for breeding animals, and thus promote farm enlargement.
A similar process occurs in the.land market. The prospect of a
capital gains tax rate well below his marginal income tax rate can lead
a high income individual to invest heavily in capital improvements that
will increase the value of the property when sold. His goal is to convert
ordinary income into capital gains. Since he does not need additional income
to meet daily living expenses, he is led to tilt his investment decisions in
favor of those that will maximize capital gain rather than toward those that
will increase current income. liewill favor value-enhancing investment over
output-increasing investments.
If we could assume that the land market was a perfect equilibrating
device, reflecting the capitalized present value of an accurately calculated
stream of future incomes, the main consequence of this tilt would be to favor
investments in long-run, slow pay-out land improving measures. The result
would be a lengthened time-frame for investment planning.
It is at this point chat the disturbing influence of inflation enters
the analysis. If land is des~red as a storehouse of value rather than as a
producer of annual income flows, market prices for land can greatly exceed
capf.talized present values of the income stream. This is now the case, in
most of the agricultural regions of the United States.-9-
A preferential capital gains tax draws capital into real estate, not
by the promise of higher earnings, but by the promise of greater value
retention. This distorts investment patterns, displaces operators whose
focus is on income flow rather than on net worth, and encourages patterns of
land use that will minimize supervisory costs while waiting for land values
to rise. It favors the highly mechanized cash grain farm or the single-
purpose feed lot over a multiple enterprise crop and livestock unit, with
a consequent loss of shock absorbing capacity. It is noteworthy in this
regard that the agricultural protest movement of the 1976-79 period in the
United States has drawn the majority of its support from highly mechanized
cas’hcrop farmers, practicing a largely monocultural hrm of land use in
regions of high climatic hazard.-1o-
Risk Assumption
One of the most rapidly expanding ways in which federal policy influences
land use is through the assumption of risk. This involves all of the classic
questions of land use: where is it used, how is it u~.ed,and who is using it?
In the economic literature,these questions are typically posed as issues of
efficiency and equity. In this framework, federal price support programs for
farm commodities provide the outstanding example of land use consequences
flowing from governmental assumption of risk.
Any guarantee of farm commodity prices has a differential effect on
farms in at least two major dimensions: location and size. The location
variable combines both economic and climatic riskj in that the crops most
often subjected to wide price variations are in general those produced in
areas of greatest climatic hazard. The effect of federal price support
programs has been to sustain production in high risk areas at levels that
would not have been feasible if all risk was borne by the producezs. A
parallel can be drawn with building construction in flood plains.
It is generally agreed that public policy should discourage development
in areas subject to recurring floods. It has usually required a major
disaster to focus attention on this issue, but there have been substantial
advances in recent years in flood plain zoning and in





Farm price support programs have had an opposite
they have encouraged agricultural expansion into






was generated by a government price support policy that has consistently
failed to include any land use goals. Support for most crops has been-11-
non-selective with regard to recipient, non-discriminatingwith regard to
location (except as freight rates to central
flat-rate function of historical production.
has been little willingness to face the fact
markets discriminate), and a
Until quite recently there
that production on some lands
is too hazardous to merit support in thi~ way.
Occasions can arise when production is needed from these high-hazard
areas, or national policy
should be maintained in a
ways to achieve this than
may dictate that agriculture in these areas
“ready reserve” status. IX so, there are cheaper
by lifting the total structure of national farm
prices to cover average costs in these high risk regions. But before these
alternatives can be attempted, a national land use policy is needed.
Some progress in this direction has been made recently through the
development of legislative proposals for the consolidation of federal
programs of crop insurance and disaster assistance. An indication of the
land use implications of these efforts is provided by data from Kiowa
County, Colorado, bordering the dust-bowl area.
In the period from 1945 through 1975 the coefficient of variation in nec
farm income was 288 percent. “Net income was negative in 13 of the 31 years.
Farmers losses during years in which crops failed nearly equaled the net
returns during years in which yields were good” (Miller and Walter, 1977,
pP. 12-13). No program based on insurance principles can be considered in
areas as hazardous as this. Whether or not production should be attempted
is a matter for national land use policy. It is apparent that risk and
uncertainty on this scale can only be assumed at the national level.
In subsidizing production in high risk areas, the most direct federal
assistance is provided by the 1973 Farm Act which authorizes the Agricultural-12”
Stabilization and Conservation Service to make disaster payments to participants
in the various commodity programs. From 1975 through 1977, payments to
farmers under this program averaged $428 million per year, accounting for
67 percent of total federal outlays for all forms of crop insurance and
disaster aid to farmers (Miller, 1978, pp. 5-7). There are in addition
disaster loan programs administered by The Farmers Home Administration and
The Small Business Administration. The degree of political popularity of
those low-interest rate loans is indicated by the fact that in 1977 just
under two-thirds of all counties in the United States were designated as
“disaster areas.”
Any federal assumption of risk also has a differential effect on farms
in different size classes. A major strength of medium sized single proprietor
farms has been their ability to absorb risk. If the farm is too small and
the risk too great the farm will fail. But if risk is reduced it increases
the attractiveness of farming to large-scale enterprises ox to non-farm
investors. Federal assumption of risk through price support programs or
through disaster assistance is not scale neutral. It is of greater value
to large operations, using highly leveraged debt financing and dependent on
a single market or a single crop. We have noted above how tax policy favors
highly mechanized monocultural forms of land use. Risk assumption by the
federal government has the same tendency to encourage large scale single-
purpose farm firms.
Historically, the major device for risk management in rural land use has
been the diversified farm. Even the largest farms find it impractical to
practice geographic risk-spreading. Unable to reduce risk by spreading
activities over space, they have instead spread risk over a variety of types
of crops or land use. This has been coupled with risk-spreading over time.-13-
This has been achieved through the perfection of a management unit --
the family-type farm -- that maximizes incentives to reduce labor costs in
times of adversity by lowering family levels of living in order to preserve
the farm firm. If this form of risk management is replaced by federal risk
assumption, either through price support or disaster aid programs> i~ will
have a profound effect on how land is used (monoculture?),where it is used
(high risk areas?), and who uses it (large scale firms?). By the scope of
i~s impact, it seems probably that federal assumption of agricultural risk
is the single most pervasive example of a federal dynamic affecting land
use.-14-
Environmental Protection Measures
The preceding examples of a federal dynamic affeccing land use have
been greatly expanded in the 1970rs but their roots trace back to Che 1930’s
and even earlier. The one genuinely new initiative from the federal level
dates from the enactment in 1969 of the National Environmental Policy Act.
Its consequences for land use are due in particular to the requirement that
a “detailed statement of environmental impacts and alternatives” preceed
any “major federal action that mig”htsignificantly affect the quality of
the human environment” (42 U.S.C. 4321.et seq.). As Andrews has emphasized,
the resulting Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) shift the emphasis from
lancluse to the actions of government. The governmental decision-making
process becomes the focus of attention, instead of a geographically defined
land area (Andrews, 1975, p. 39). The goal has been to force various
single-mission agencies of government to consider the external effects of
proposed actions as they in~errelate with other governmental programs and
wit”hthe environment. In effect, the EIS originated as an internal
housekeeping measure within the federal government to insure a better
environmental accounting. It can be likened to the imposition of a double-
entry sys~em of bookkeeping, in which assets must be balanced against
J.ia’bilities, in a firm that had previously maintained only ledger accounts.
Its immed.iace goal was to bring order into the federal government in those
actions that affect land use, in its broadest environmental definition.
The consequences ‘haveextended far beyond the federal
An example will illustrate the complexity of the
large scale project involving land use, the lead time
carrying out productive investment is a major part of





lead time must be
and
of-15-
spread over the productive life of the investment as an addition to fixed
costs.
If the land using investment is in the private sector but receives
federal subsidy, or produces for an interstate market or is otherwise
subject to federal regulation, an environmental impact statement must be
prepared. This lengthens the lead time and increases the front end load.
In the typical situation this front end load is covered by borrowing,
which adds to debt, or by selling stock to investors who will forego
current income in the hope of lacer capital gains (which is in effect a.
form of borrowing).
If rapid technological change shortens the prospective productive life
of the investment this too will increase the ratio of fixed costs to operating
costs. In practice, and in many types of land use, both thingshave occurred.
The life expectancy of new technologies has declined, and investment lead
times have increased. The clearest examples involve electric power generating
facilities.
Much of the increase in lead time has been due to power plant siting
regulations that have depended heavily on the preparation of environmental
impact statements. Although power plant siting is typically governed by
state law, the standards specified typically depend upon the federally
required environmental impact statements.
The lengthened lead times and increased ratio of fixed to operating
cost make the cost of borrowed capital a critical variable in any enterprise
that depends upon the private capital market. In the case of private sector
eledtric generating plants, it creates a strong incentive to reduce initial
capital expenditures where possible, and shift as much of total cost onto
operating costs. In practice, this leads private utilities using coal as a
fuel to locate the generating plant as near the market as possible, in order--16-
to reduce the capital cost of transmission lines (a part of the front end
load).
Maximum efficiency in resource use might dictate mine-mouth location of
the generating facility and long distance transmission of the power. If the
public utility obtains its capital from the private market it will find mine-
mouth location uneconomic if lead times have been greatly increased by
environmental protection measures. Its solution is to haul the coal long
distances and transmit the power short distances. The reason: coal transport
costs can be legitimately used as a basis for rate setting based on
demonstrated operating costs. Transmission line costs are a part of capital
costs and worsen the ratio of debt service charges to cash flow. In effect,
anything that lengthens the lead time, as environmental protection measures
have done, has at least two consequences:
1.) It increases the probability that responsibility for electric power
generation will have to be assumed by government, due to the high
capital costs imposed by greatly lengthened lead times.
2) It distorts decisions regarding mineral land use by shifting the
incidence of costs associated with rail transport of coal relative
to powerline transport of power.
It seems reasonable to conclude from this example that the initial
usefulness of environmental protection measures in calling attention to
unintended spillover effects of governmental actions is now itself in need of
study. It is not facetious to suggest that we have now progressed to the
point where we need more careful analysis of the economic impact of environmental
impact statements.-17-
We can note in this development a variation on the same themes that
emerged in the discussion of tax policy and risk assumption. The federal
dynamic in land use decisions is having an indirect (and unintended) but
powerful influence on where land is used, how it is used and who uses it.
The influence on the “where” and the “how” is not surprising, and is open
to analysis by the use of market prices and environmental and conservation
criteria that are widely available although not always widely accepted.
Tl,emost problematic unknown introduced by federal determinants of land use
concerns the ‘Vwho”of use.
Influence upon the scale of firms, the provision of capital, the nature
of the motivation for saving
rights in resource ownership
policies affecting land use.
and investment, and ehe distribution of property
emerge as the key questions raised by federal
The influence of these policies is shifting
the frontier between public and private spheres
in favor of the public sector. This is perhaps
emphatic consequence of the growing concern for
of operational responsibility,
the most significant and
environmental protection.-18-
Grants in Aid of Highways
The discussion to this point has dealt with federal activities that
were not primarily designed to affect land use. We come now to a class
of measures that were explicitly intended to achieve land use changes,
usually of a kind chat would turn sand into gold.
In terms of tradition, cost effectiveness and immediacy of response
the most potent of the various intentional federal policies affecting
lancluse has been cost-sharing through grants-in-aid to the states to
promace internal improvements. Dating from our earliest days as a nation,
these have typically involved transport, in many versions. Wagon roads,
canals$ rivers and harbors~ railroads, highways and airports have in
successive generations been the recipients of massive capital contributions,
with land use consequences of far-reaching importance.
The most msssive of these expressions of direct federal power to alter
land use in the Twentieth Century has been the system of federal aids
for highway construction. If any single example of a federal dynamic
in land use is to be selected as dominant in our age it is the Federal
Interstate and Defense Highway Act of 1956. The funds to finance this
system are derived primarily from taxes on motor fuel-and tires. Revenues
are a linear function of distance traveled. The money has been spent
to link citiesj and increasingly to save Eravel time and relieve congestion
in metropolitan areas. With distance
distance plus time in the expenditure
me effect has been to generate large
only in the revenue function, and
function, we have created a money-pump.
windfall capital gains for landowners
at the urban fringe and to encourage rapid suburbanization.
The result has been the sprawled city, the Linear cf,ty~then.odular
city, and an urban life style that maximizes our dependence on petroleum-19-
fuels. The error in this system is its lack of symmet~y. Tn any activity
in which space is a key
control of access. The
been made has precluded
from creation of access
private land owners and
variable, the dynamic determinant is creation and
method by which highway location decisions have
the balancing of windfalls with wipeouts. The gain
has been immediate and largely appropri.able by
users. The incidence of loss has been diffuse,
spread over a much longer time period, and the burden of its repair falls
heavily upon the public secEor. The obvious land use dimensioniof federal
grants in aid of highways has been the use of the federal taxing power to
create new wealth in land. The hidden dimension has been the creation of
an asymmetrical transfer mechanism that shifts income from land users to
land owners.
The efforts to introduce balance into this system have largely been
confined to the use of enviromnental impact studies focused upon the
physical environment. There is no federal requirement for the parallel
development of national economic or region-wide impact studies that
transcend the Iocaltties affected by specfflc highway segments. The
political process has at times generated intense study of fragments of
the system, with the controversy centered upon
Some method is needed to confront the question
built?”, instead of the more typical question,
the question of location.
?Jshouldthis highway be
“where should it be
located?” Until this is achieved through federal coordination, we will
continue to condemn to haphazard use one of the most effective potential
tools for land use guidance.-20-
DO We Need a Land Ethic?
This brief survey has attempted to highlight some of thewaysin which
policies of the federal government are affecting land use, Some are
intentional, but more often they are unplanned consequences of action
designed to achieve other goals. One reaction to this confusion of
purpose has been a call for the development of a land ethic, Tn a study
that seems destined to become a classic in the land use literature of
the United StatesJ Bossdnan and Callies based their interpretation of
The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control on the recent change in emphasis
from land as a commodity to land as a resource (Bosselmanand Callies,
1971, p. 31.5),
IL is both, as they rightly point out. But this play on words obscures
more than it reveals. The ~mpl~cat,~on is apparently that land as a
resource should not be traded, or dealt with in the market place. This
seems to be the only interpretation that gives sense to the distinction.
Xc is more appropriate co turn the argument around. There is evidence
from our Courtsj our legislatures, and our credit system that land has not
been treated as just another commodity. It has not been regulated in inter-
state commerce until quite recently. Transactions in land are not subject
to revf.ewby price-setting and rate--making bodies, as are the prices of
other commodities that have a high component of public utility. It has
not been possible to transfer use rights or ownership





Many cultures have sanctiff.ed land. Even in nomhally monotheistic
cultures it has often contributed an element of pantheism that in an
extreme form can legitimately ‘becalled land worship. The remarkable feature
of the settlement history of North America is that this land worship was
constrained. Land was desired, ‘butit was not sanctified. Instead of
arguing for an ethic that would freeze land into uses deemed appropriate
by this generation, it is more persuasive to argue that land should be
created more like a commodity, not less. It should be subject to the wfitire
range of regulations~ controls, review, and specificatiofi that are required
in a market economy for the efficient functioning of markets (Babcock, 1975,
Pp. 12-18).
It is not that we lack a land ethic. It %s rather that we have not
divested ourselves of a now outmoded land ethic. Our Anglo-Saxon attitudes
and land laws evolved to protect land users when there were no stable
governments~ no accessible systems of justice, inadequate modes of
transport and marketing, and no functional systems of welfare dcher than
the one provided by land ownership.
Nazi Germany had a land ethic. Marxism provides a variation that is
less racist but no less rigid. Tribal societies are retarded by land
ethics that are major barriers to the recognition of their human potential.
What we now need to do is to demythokbgize land. The call for a land
ethic is a call for worship at the feet of a false god.-22-
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